We examine whether equity market variables, such as stock returns and equity-based default probabilities, are useful to U.S. bank supervisors for assessing the condition of domestic bank holding companies. We develop a model of supervisory ratings that combines supervisory and equity market information. We find that the model's forecasts anticipate supervisory rating changes by up to four quarters. Relative to simply using supervisory variables, the inclusion of equity market variables in the model does not improve forecast accuracy. However, we argue that equity market information should still be useful for forecasting supervisory ratings and should be incorporated into supervisory monitoring models.
institutions. Importantly, inspections are infrequent. Most institutions typically receive about one on-site visit per year. Between these visits, there is potentially enough time for an institution's risk profile to change dramatically. Off-site monitoring typically consists of gathering and analyzing supervisory data through standard regulatory reporting forms. These data arrive on a quarterly basis and provide detailed information on a BHC's balance sheet and performance history. Offsite monitoring permits relatively more timely supervisory analysis and more efficient allocation of scarce supervisory resources, but it relies heavily on data which do not contain forward-looking variables that would predict changes in BHC risk profiles. 1 In an attempt to address these limitations in their monitoring methods, bank supervisors are exploring the expanded use of market discipline and financial market information to supplement their efforts.
2 If markets are efficient and investors can assess a BHC's true condition and riskiness, then financial market data could potentially provide timely signals about changes in risks. Market data could also be useful for validating supervisory assessments and actions.
Although there appears to be agreement on the conceptual merits of incorporating financial market information into supervisory monitoring, no consensus on how to do so has developed. To date, much of the research on this question has focused on subordinated debt, primarily because the concerns of debt holders are thought to be more closely aligned with those of the supervisors. 3 In this paper, we focus on the potential contribution of equity market information to the supervisory monitoring of BHCs. While we do not argue against using debt market information, we do believe that equity market information has been somewhat overlooked and has several important advantages over bond market information.
First, the equity market is thought to be much more efficient in processing information than the corporate bond markets, with lower bid-ask spreads, more volume, and more reliable pricing information. 4 Second, more BHCs have traded equity than have traded subordinated debt. For the BHCs in our sample, only 10% had outstanding subordinated debt at year-end 1999 and these firms accounted for 67% of total BHC assets at that time. An even smaller percentage had issues with a satisfactory amount of liquidity to generate reliable prices. In contrast, almost 25% of the BHCs had publicly traded equity and they accounted for about 85% of 1. For most institutions, off-site monitoring consists of the analysis of quarterly reporting forms. However, large, complex, banking organizations often have a continuous, on-site supervisory presence. See DeFerrari and Palmer (2001) for a discussion of current supervisory policy.
2. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) issued a proposal for a new international accord on commercial bank capital requirements that will rely explicitly on market discipline. The Committee stated that improved disclosure would enhance the role of market participants in the setting of appropriate levels of bank capital. This reasoning assumes that market participants will feel sufficiently at risk to make use of the additional disclosure.
3. Examples of this research include Bliss and Flannery (2001) , DeYoung et al. (2001) , Evanoff and Wall (2000) , Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , Hancock and Kwast (2000) as well as the Board of Governors (1999) .
4. For a further discussion of this point, see Saunders (2001) .
BHC assets (see Table 1 ). If the aim is to harness market information for a large portion of the banking industry, supervisors simply cannot ignore equity markets. Third, a primary conclusion of the early studies of market discipline was that large banking institutions were perceived to be too-big-to-fail, and thus, bond market participants had little incentive monitor. While there is evidence that bond market investors may be monitoring more vigorously following a stated retreat from this policy (see Flannery and Sorescu 1996) , the point remains that information in subordinated debt spreads must depend on the regulatory regime's safety net. Equity prices should be much less sensitive to this concern. In this paper we examine the potential contribution of various equity market indicators of BHC performance for predicting supervisory BHC ratings, known as BOPEC ratings. 5 Specifically, we estimate a core BOPEC off-site monitoring model (BOM) of BHC ratings that depends only on supervisory variables. Using variables from quarterly regulatory reports and supervisory databases, we estimate ordered logit models of BOPEC ratings and generate one-quarter-ahead BOPEC forecasts for all BHCs in our sample. We find that these forecasts can correctly signal changes in BOPEC ratings up to four quarters prior to assignment. We then incorporate equity market variables into an extended BOM model to test whether these additional variables improve the model's forecasting performance. We find that these augmented forecasts also anticipate BOPEC changes by up to four quarters. However, the improvement in forecast accuracy is not statistically significant relative to the forecasts based solely on supervisory variables.
Our empirical results suggest that equity market information is moderately useful for modeling BOPEC rating changes. While equity market variables do not improve the forecasting performance of the BOM model dramatically within our sample period, we still recommend that they be incorporated into off-site supervisory monitoring, 5. Note that in this paper we focus on supervisory ratings and not defaults, another key supervisory concern. There exists an extensive literature on firm default dating back to Altman (1968) and bank default dating back to Meyer and Pifer (1970) , Sinkey (1975) , and Pettway and Sinkey (1980) . See Flannery (1998 Flannery ( , 2001 for broader discussions on the value of financial market variables for supervisory monitoring. especially given the ease with which it can be done using the BOM model. As noted by Flannery (2001) , financial market information should complement supervisory information in that more accurate forecasts of BHC condition can be made using both sources of information than with either one alone.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we provide a brief overview of the U.S. supervisory process for BHCs. We also provide a brief survey of the academic literature on off-site monitoring models and the use of financial market information for supervisory monitoring. In Section 2, we describe the BOPEC ratings used in the study. In Section 3, we present our proposed BOM model and evaluate its forecast accuracy. Section 4 concludes.
SUPERVISION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
The Federal Reserve is the supervisor of BHCs in the U.S. Full-scope, on-site inspections are a key element of this supervisory process. Inspection frequencies vary, but they are generally conducted on an annual basis. Although the Federal Reserve also carries out targeted inspections that may or may not be conducted onsite, we focus here on full-scope, on-site inspections since they provide the most comprehensive supervisory assessments of BHCs.
At the conclusion of an inspection, supervisors assign the BHC a numerical rating called a composite BOPEC rating that summarizes their opinion of the BHC's overall health and financial condition. 6 The BOPEC acronym stands for the five key areas of supervisory concern: the condition of the BHC's Bank subsidiaries, Other nonbank subsidiaries, Parent company, Earnings, and Capital adequacy. The top rating category is a rating of 1, while the bottom category is a rating of 5. A rating of 1 or 2 indicates that the BHC is not considered to be of supervisory concern. Note that BOPEC ratings, as well as all other inspection materials, are highly confidential and are never made publicly available.
Much like bond ratings, BOPEC ratings and other supervisory ratings are generally described as absolute ratings. That is, supervisory ratings are broadly defined relative to supervisory standards of concern and are not defined in direct relation to other financial institutions. We find empirical support for this point in that the distribution of BOPEC ratings shifted dramatically as the banking sector emerged from the recession in the early 1990s.
Between on-site inspections when private supervisory information cannot be gathered as readily, supervisors monitor BHCs using an off-site monitoring system based on quarterly regulatory reports filed by BHCs and their subsidiary banks. This off-site monitoring system is based primarily on two key information sources. The first source, known as the BHC Performance Report, is a detailed summary of the quarterly Y-9C regulatory reporting forms. 7 As of March 1999, the report 6. For an international survey of supervisory bank rating systems, see Sahajwala and Van den Bergh (2000) . summarized approximately 800 BHC variables across several years. From this report, certain variables are selected as key performance criteria. If a BHC fails to meet these criteria in a given quarter, it is noted as an exception that requires further monitoring. The second source of information for off-site BHC monitoring is the supervisory CAMELS ratings assigned to banks within a holding company. The CAMELS acronym refers to the six areas of supervisory concern: the bank's Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to risk. The composite CAMELS rating also ranges in integer value from 1 to 5 in decreasing order (i.e., banks that perform best are assigned a rating of 1). Since the condition of a BHC is closely related to the condition of its subsidiary banks, recently assigned CAMELS ratings are closely monitored within the off-site BHC surveillance program.
As with on-site BHC inspections, on-site bank examinations occur at approximately a yearly frequency, which is long enough for the gathered supervisory information to decay and become less representative of the bank's condition. 8 To address this issue, in 1993 the Federal Reserve instituted an off-site monitoring system for banks, known as the System for Estimating Examiner Ratings (SEER). The SEER system consists of two separate models that forecast bank failures over a two-year horizon as well as bank CAMELS ratings for the next quarter. The model that we are most interested in here is the latter, which is an ordered logit model with five categories corresponding to the five possible values of the CAMELS rating. The model is estimated every quarter using the most recent bank supervisory variables and the last two quarters of assigned CAMELS ratings. Significant changes in a bank's CAMELS rating as forecasted by the SEER model could be sufficient to warrant closer monitoring of the bank. The off-site BHC surveillance program also explicitly monitors the forecasted CAMELS ratings.
Literature Review
Modern theories of financial intermediation, such as that of Diamond (1984) , stress the role of banks as monitors and processors of credit information. One strand of empirical work that has flowed from this model of banking seeks to shed light on whether banks, as specialists in solving problems of asymmetric information between firms and investors, are themselves opaque to investors. Several studies have looked at whether interest rates on bank liabilities are responsive to measures of default risk, and the evidence supporting bank transparency has been mixed. Looking at new issues of large certificates of deposit (CDs), Hannan and Hanweck (1988) find that CD rates are sensitive to measures of bank risk such as the volatility of return on assets and capital ratios. Interestingly, it has been more difficult to establish a correlation between risk and yields on bank debentures, which are typically junior and of longer maturity than CDs (see Gorton and Santomero 1990) . Of course, not finding a relationship between bank risk and yields on bank liabilities does 8. See Cole and Gunther (1998) as well as Hirtle and Lopez (1999) for further discussion of this issue. not necessarily suggest that bank assets are too opaque for investors to value. Rather, it could be the case that bank risk is actually less than what is measured by the usual risk proxies. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) demonstrate that the market's perceptions of the government's too-big-to-fail policy are empirically important. They find that following the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 and its stated retreat from too-big-to-fail, spreads on bank debt became more responsive to risk measures.
A related branch of the literature has sought to find whether banks are more opaque to investors relative to comparable nonbank firms. Morgan (2002) presents evidence that this is the case when it comes to ratings agency evaluations of bonds. He finds that the agencies are more likely to disagree on a debt rating when the issuing firm is a bank. Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (1999) turn to stock market data to address this question. Arguing that firms with opaque assets are likely to have larger bid-ask spreads, they analyze the microstructure properties of a sample of small, publicly traded banks. They find that smaller banks have larger spreads than large bank spreads, but that bank spreads are not large relative to the spreads of smaller firms in other industries. In addition, other measures such as trading volume or analyst coverage do not indicate that banks are less transparent than nonbanks. Thus, equity market information can convey information on bank condition and could potentially supplement supervisory assessments.
The branch of the literature most related to this paper concerns the interaction of market evaluations of bank condition with supervisory assessments. Berger and Davies (1998) use an event study framework to examine whether daily stock prices react ex-post to CAMELS rating changes. Even though these ratings are confidential, they find that BHC stock prices respond to these changes, implying that supervisory assessments provide valuable information that the equity market can detect. They conjecture that market participants view the supervisory rating as both a certification of financial statements and as an indicator of future regulatory treatment.
9 Using data from the bond markets, DeYoung et al. (2001) find that supervisory information significantly affects contemporaneous and subsequent changes in the spreads on bank debentures. They find that the private supervisory information in bank CAMELS ratings impacted debenture spreads for several months after the CAMELS assignment.
Our paper fits into the group of studies that looks at the ability of financial markets to anticipate, or lead supervisory ratings. Note that market participants are not actively trying to guess what supervisory ratings are or will be, nor do they ever officially learn the outcomes of supervisory inspections. This literature tests whether there is some alignment between investor and supervisory concerns that would allow supervisors to use the more timely market data for their own purposes. Thus, supervisory ratings must be correlated with variables that investors care about, such as risk and expected return. This correlation could arise because supervisory 9. Note that Allen, Jagtiani, and Moser (2001) did not find evidence that supervisory ratings affect market assessments when the confidential ratings of banks' management (i.e., the "M" component of the CAMELS rating) become public knowledge. However, the results are tied to a one-time change in charter status and may not hold more generally.
actions could have an impact on the return distribution, or because the conditions that lead to good supervisory ratings are consistent with those that lead to improvements in stock price. Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) pursue this idea by examining the timeliness and accuracy of supervisory and market assessments of large BHCs. Their study is one of the few that uses both equity and bond market information. They find that market assessments focus on different aspects of BHC performance than do supervisory assessments. Supervisory assessments, defined with respect to BOPEC ratings, are most closely related to bond market assessments, meaning that supervisory variables are shown to Granger-cause bond market variables, and vice versa. However, this relationship is not apparent between supervisory assessments and equity market assessments; that is, they find very little Granger causality from equity market variables to their supervisory assessment variables. Furthermore, they find that, after accounting for market assessments, supervisory variables do not contribute substantially to the modeling of future indicators of BHC performance, such as changes in nonperforming loans. Overall, their findings suggest that supervisors, bond market participants, and equity market participants produce complementary information on BHC performance.
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Policymakers have considered the possibility of explicitly linking supervisory policy to financial market signals. Since the interests of bank supervisors are supposedly most closely aligned with bank subordinated debt holders, most of the exploratory work on this issue has concentrated on the signal quality in subordinated debt spreads.
11 For example, Evanoff and Wall (2000) model changes in the supervisory ratings of banks and BHCs with outstanding subordinated debt as a function of lagged subordinated debt spreads and regulatory capital ratios over the period from 1990 to 1999. They find that subordinated debt spreads do as well as or better than capital ratios at explaining supervisory ratings.
Our paper differs from the existing literature in three respects. First, our emphasis on equity market variables from 1990 to 1999 allows us to consider a larger BHC sample than much of the previous literature. Second, our focus on equity market activity up to a year prior to BOPEC assignments should provide clear insight into the timeliness of market signals. Third, we conduct explicit, out-of-sample forecasting tests that examine the usefulness of equity market information to supervisors in a systematic, operational manner.
10. Several recent studies have produced supporting evidence. Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) and Hall et al. (2001) found that equity-based market signals provide useful information that supplements supervisory assessments. Elmer and Fissel (2001) and Curry, Elmer, and Fissel (2001) further support this conclusion by finding that equity market variables add value to supervisory models of bank failure. Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan (2001) found that default risk premia for jumbo CDs, as derived from financial statement variables, do not predict CAMELS downgrades as well as a traditional econometric model for a sample of small banks. Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2001) provide evidence in favor of using market information for the supervision of European banks.
11. One objection to this proposition is found in Bliss (2000) . He shows that supervisory interests may diverge from bondholder interests in that both parties may not necessarily agree on the relative riskiness of different banks or bank portfolios.
THE BOPEC SAMPLE
The core database for our analysis is the set of BOPEC ratings assigned to BHCs over the period from 1990 to 1999. We analyze only BOPEC ratings assigned after onsite, full-scope inspections due to the concern that limited and targeted inspections produce a less comprehensive supervisory information set than a full inspection. Our sample of BOPEC ratings is further refined to include only inspections of toptier BHCs since they are typically the legal entity within a banking group that issues publicly traded equity. We further require each BHC to have filed four quarters of supervisory data and to have been assigned at least one prior BOPEC rating. These requirements allow us to avoid issues regarding de novo BHCs and new institutions arising from mergers. Table 2 summarizes our sample with respect to asset size. The full sample contains 3407 BOPEC ratings for 1092 different BHCs. The mean and median number of ratings per BHC is 3.1 and 2, respectively; the minimum and maximum numbers are 1 and 11, respectively. The sample contains 1520 BOPEC ratings for publicly traded BHCs, which represents approximately 45% of the full sample. These ratings correspond to 394 unique institutions, resulting in an average of 3.9 ratings per BHC that is slightly higher than for the full sample. Most of the BHCs in the sample are relatively small, with less than $1 billion in total assets. Only 50 BHCs are larger than $100 billion in assets. Note that publicly traded BHCs are generally larger than private BHCs, with 68% having total assets greater than $1 billion relative to 14% for privately held BHCs. Further note that a roughly equal number of inspections occurred in the first and second halves of the sample period for all but the largest BHC categories. Table 3 presents the distribution of BOPEC ratings assigned in each year for all BHCs and for publicly traded BHCs, respectively. Note that the ratings distributions are quite similar. The majority of the ratings clearly fall in the upper two categories, which indicates that a BHC's financial condition and risk profile are of little supervisory concern. Although the distribution fluctuates over the sample, the percentage of ratings in the top two categories for all BHCs never falls below 63% observed in 1991. For publicly traded BHCs, the lowest percentage is 66% in 1991.
The maximum percentage of BOPEC 1 and 2 ratings for all BHCs is 95% in 1997, and for public BHCs, it is 99% in 1997. Note that there are very few BOPEC 5 ratings in the sample, most probably due to the fact that both supervisors and bankers take actions to try to prevent this outcome, and to the fact that lowrated institutions quickly improve their ratings, merge with stronger institutions, or simply close. Tables 4A and 4B present the patterns of BOPEC changes in the sample. The most frequent outcome is no change, accounting for between 58% to 82% of the annual totals and about 69% for the full sample. Similarly for public BHCs, the annual percentage fluctuates from 62% to 83% and makes up 70% of the sample. The pattern of BOPEC upgrades and downgrades fluctuates over the sample. For 1990 and 1991, more downgrades occurred in the full and public samples than upgrades, with the pattern reversing from 1992 through 1998. The pattern appears to follow the general trends in the banking industry and the macroeconomy more generally during the 1990s.
THE BOPEC OFF-SITE MONITORING MODEL
We model BOPEC ratings as a function of both supervisory and equity market variables. This modeling framework permits us to consider directly whether equity market variables can provide supervisors with information beyond what is available to them from supervisory data sources. We examine this question with respect to both in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecast performance. Notes: The BOPEC rating changes are from full scope, on-site inspections during the period 1990 through 1999. The change in BOPEC ratings is relative to the previously assigned rating. The definition of a BHC used in this table is the definition used in constructing our dataset; i.e., a top-tier BHC with an identifiable lead bank and four quarters of available supervisory reporting data.
Our proposed BOM model is an ordered logit. The simple BOM model assumes that the BOPEC rating assigned to BHC i in quarter t, denoted BP* it , is an unobservable continuous variable based on supervisory variables available in quarter t -2,
where x it-2 is a vector of explanatory variables unique to BHC i observed two quarters prior to the BOPEC assignment and I it-1 is an indicator variable for whether the BHC was publicly traded in the prior quarter. The interaction term I it-1 x it-2 allows us to control for possible differences between private and publicly traded BHCs with respect to the supervisory variables. The error term ε it has a standard logistic distribution. Clearly, we would prefer to use supervisory variables from the end of quarter t -1, but these data are generally not available until about 60 days after the end of the quarter. Since one of our aims is to conduct an out-of-sample forecasting exercise, we err on the conservative side to ensure the integrity of the necessary information sets and just use supervisory data dated two quarters prior to the inspection. Since BP* it is unobserved, we can only model the observable BOPEC rating BP it ʦ {1,2,3,4,5}. Thus, in addition to the β and γ parameters, we must also estimate four cutpoints, denoted α, that divide the range of BP* it into five categories. The parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood methods (see Greene, 2001 for details).
The choice of which supervisory variables to include as regressors is challenging. No simple behavioral models exist of how supervisors assign BOPEC ratings, and there are more than 800 variables at the supervisors' disposal for this purpose. For this study, we selected a small number of explanatory variables that are reasonable proxies for the five components of the BOPEC rating. We chose a parsimonious specification both to avoid overfitting the data and to construct a model that would generate reasonable out-of-sample forecasts.
The ten explanatory variables used in this study are summarized in Tables 5A  and 5B for all and public BHCs, respectively. The first variable is the natural log of total BHC assets, which is our control variable for BHC size. If large institutions enjoy economies of scale that make them more profitable, or if large institutions are better managed than smaller institutions, then we would expect the sign on the total assets coefficient to be negative.
The second variable is the BOPEC rating assigned at the BHC's previous fullscope, on-site inspection. This variable should still contain useful information on current BHC condition, although the information probably decays over time, as shown in studies on CAMELS ratings by Cole and Gunther (1998) and Hirtle and Lopez (1999) . In addition, this variable can be viewed as a summary measure for other supervisory information, such as BHC liability structure, not explicitly captured by the remaining eight variables.
The next three variables are used to capture the supervisory concerns regarding BHC bank subsidiaries summarized in the "B" component of the rating. The third variable is the CAMELS rating of the BHC's lead bank.
12 Higher CAMELS ratings indicate that the lead bank is of increased supervisory concern. Hence, we would expect this coefficient to be positive in the estimation. The fourth variable is the ratio of BHC nonperforming loans, nonaccrual loans, and other real estate owned to its total assets. This "problem loans" variable proxies for the health and performance of the BHC's loan portfolio. We would expect BHCs with more problem loans to have lower ratings. Thus, the sign on this coefficient is expected to be positive. The fifth variable is the ratio of BHC allowances (or provisions) for losses 12. Some BHCs identify a lead bank in their regulatory filings. If a BHC did not report which bank was its lead bank, we assigned the lead status to its largest bank. Note that supervisors often calculate an asset-weighted, average CAMELS rating across a BHC's banks as an estimate of the bank-rating component. on loans and leases (ALLL) to its total loans, another proxy for the health and performance of the BHC's lending portfolio. Like the previous variable, we would expect the coefficient on ALLL to be positive. The sixth variable is an indicator of whether the BHC engages in securities trading (i.e., has a Section 20 subsidiary). This variable is a proxy for the types of nonbank activities the BHC is engaged in and thus speaks to the "O" component of the BOPEC rating. The seventh variable is the ratio of a BHC's trading assets, whether located in banking or nonbanking subsidiaries, to its total assets. 13 If the presence of a trading subsidiary in the holding company serves to increase its overall risk, then we might expect the coefficients on these two variables to be positive. However, previous research (Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian 2002) has in fact found that BHC 13. Note that the trading assets variable as currently reported first became available in the first quarter of 1995. Before then, we proxy for BHC trading assets using the self-reported replacement costs of interest rate and foreign exchange derivative contracts. risk measures did not change significantly after the commencement of Section 20 activity.
The eighth variable is the so-called "double leverage" ratio between a BHC and its lead bank, which is the ratio of the lead bank's equity capital to that of the parent's equity capital. This variable provides a measure of the soundness of the parent BHC, indicating the extent to which the parent's equity capital could be used to buffer against losses at the lead bank. Thus, we would expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative. We use this variable as a proxy for the condition of the parent BHC as summarized in the "P" component of the BOPEC rating. The ninth variable is BHC returns on average assets (ROAA), defined as the ratio of the fourquarter average of a BHC's net income to the four-quarter average of its assets. This variable is used to proxy for the "E" component of the BOPEC rating and would be expected to have a negative coefficient. The tenth variable is the ratio of BHC equity capital to its total assets. This variable is used to proxy for the "C" component of the BOPEC rating.
14 The coefficient on this variable is also expected to be negative.
We refer to the version of the BOM model in Equation (1) as the core model. The extended BOM model incorporating equity market information is specified as
where z it-1 is a vector of equity market variables corresponding to publicly traded BHC i at the end of quarter t -1 and I t-1 is again an indicator variable for publicly traded BHCs. For private BHCs, the z it-1 variables are necessarily set equal to zero, and thus, we include the fixed effect θ I t-1 for publicly traded BHCs to account for the possibility that an equity market variable takes on a zero value. Note that since equity market variables are observed at a higher frequency than the supervisory variables, we can include equity market information at the end of quarter t -1 in the information set available for modeling purposes. We use four equity market variables in our analysis. The first two variables are derived from the decomposition of monthly BHC stock returns (R it ) before a BOPEC assignment into a systematic, marketwide component (SR it ), and an idiosyncratic, BHC-specific component (AR it ). 15 The decomposition is based on the two-factor model R it ϭ α ϩ β 1 R mt ϩ β 2 f t ϩ υ it , where R mt is the monthly return on the CRSP value-weighted index, f t is the monthly change in the federal funds rate, and υ it is a normal error term. For each BOPEC assignment in our sample, the regression's parameters are estimated using monthly data for a period of at least two years ending at the month one year prior to the assignment quarter's end. The SR it variables for the 12 months between the end of the estimation period and prior to a BOPEC assignment are calculated 14. A variety of capital measures have been used in previous studies; see Evanoff and Wall (2000) and Estrella, Park, and Peristiani (2000) . We use a simple measure to facilitate comparison over the entire ten-year period.
15. This type of decomposition is common in the event study literature and is summarized in Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1997). as SR it ϭ α ϩ β 1 R mt ϩ b 2 f t , and the corresponding AR it variables are simply formed as AR it ϭ R it -SR it .
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Given the quarterly timing structure of the extended BOM model, we need to transform these variables from a monthly to a quarterly frequency. To do so, we form the cumulative monthly stock return for BHC i over the nine-month period between the 12 months and the three months prior to the end of the quarter in which a BOPEC rating is assigned. This variable is denoted as CR it-1 . As an example, consider an inspection in the last quarter of the year. The cumulative return is the sum of nine monthly returns beginning in January of that year and ending in September of the same year. The corresponding systematic and idiosyncratic component returns are formed in the same way.
To permit comparison across BHCs and across time, we standardize the cumulative returns using the estimated standard errors for CAR it-1 , as defined in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) . The standardized form of these variables is
, or equivalently, SCR itϪ1 ϭ SCSR itϪ1 ϩ SCAR it-1 . We use both the SCSR itϪ1 and SCAR itϪ1 variables in the extended BOM model, and they should indicate whether general market movements as well as idiosyncratic BHC stock returns help explain BOPEC assignments. The third equity market variable used is the popular "expected default frequencies" (or EDFs) produced by the financial software firm KMV. 17 EDFs are probability forecasts of firm defaults within one year. As shown by Merton (1974) , a firm's equity is an option on its underlying assets. Using this structural modeling approach, KMV estimates a firm's unobservable asset volatility and its EDF, which requires additional information about the firm's liability structure and a historical database of defaults. We use the available set of quarter-end EDFs for BHCs over our sample period in the model.
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The fourth equity market variable is a simple estimate of BHC asset volatility. We first estimate BHC stock return volatility over the two years prior to a BOPEC assignment. We then combine this equity volatility estimate with the necessary balance sheet data to generate an asset volatility, as in Ronn and Verma (1986) . This measure should provide insight into the extent to which EDF values, which contain a more sophisticated measure of asset volatility, could provide additional information to supervisors. 16 . Analysis of the 12-month period prior to an event, such as a BOPEC assignment, is a reasonable and common period over which to examine equity market behavior.
17. See Crosbie and Bohn (2002) for a description of KMV's computational methodology. 18. KMV makes a distinction between financial and nonfinancial firms because of the differing natures of the firms' balance sheets and funding sources. However, in theory and in practice, KMV's financial EDF values are similar to their nonfinancial counterparts. See Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) for further analysis of EDF values and supervisory ratings.
For a variety of reasons, the equity market variables are not available for all publicly traded BHCs over the entire sample period. For example, we cannot generate reliable SCSR and SCAR variables when a BHC does not have at least two years of stock return data with which to estimate the two-factor market model. In some cases, several EDF values are missing from the dataset, particularly prior to 1995. To address this issue, we replaced the missing values with their in-sample means based on the available observations. We also included fixed effects to account for this data adjustment. 19 This procedure does not affect the model's parameter estimates and allows us to use the entire BOPEC sample in our estimation. Table 6A presents the estimation results for three BOM model specifications; the core BOM model without interacted terms for public BHCs, the core model with interactions, and the extended model containing the four equity market variables.
Full Sample Estimation Results
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A p value of less than 5% indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. Recall that the model coefficients for the supervisory variables corresponding to privately owned BHCs are simply the reported β estimates, while the coefficients corresponding to publicly traded BHCs are the sum of the β and γ estimates.
The estimation results can be summarized as follows. The interacted variables are clearly important to the model. We can reject the null hypothesis that γ ϭ 0 as in the first model using the likelihood ratio test; the p value on this χ 2 statistic of 31.188 is below 1%. Focusing on the core model results, most of the supervisory variables are significant and have the appropriate sign. Larger BHCs tend to have better BOPEC ratings, which may be attributed to larger banks having more diversified asset portfolios and better overall management. However, this effect is reduced for public BHCs. Note that the lagged BOPEC ratings variable is statistically significant and indicates that higher prior ratings contribute to higher current ratings.
The strong link between the supervisory assessments of banks and of their holding companies is illustrated by a significant positive coefficient on the CAMELS variable; i.e., a CAMELS downgrade (i.e., an increase in rating) causes the parent's BOPEC rating to be downgraded as well. For public BHCs, this effect is slightly reduced. Our results further indicate that an increase in BHC problem loans or provisions for loan losses also causes BOPEC ratings to worsen.
We find that the presence of a Section 20 subsidiary causes BOPEC ratings to increase, but that this effect is effectively zero for public BHCs. Since all the BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries in the sample are public, this result suggests that 19. See Griliches (1986) for a full description of ways to cope with this type of data problem. Specifically, we use the "regression" adjustment (described on page 1488) that assumes specific parameters are constant across the subsamples of missing and nonmissing variables.
20. We tested the robustness of the results to this adjustment by estimating the extended BOM model on a subsample that excluded observations missing any equity market variable. The results were qualitatively similar to those reported here.
21. Since we have multiple BOPEC rating assignments for most BHCs, we adjust the estimated standard errors to relax the assumption that all the observations are independent (see Rogers 1993) . BHCs engaging in securities underwriting and related activities are not likely to cause increased supervisory concern. This result matches the findings by Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) , who find that several BHC risk measures did not change significantly after their Section 20 activities commenced. Our results also indicate that increases in ROAA and BHC equity capital ratio cause BOPEC ratings to decrease, and hence improve. For publicly traded BHCs, these two effects are even stronger. Finally, several variables had no impact within the core BOM model. Our results indicate that a BHC's double leverage and trading assets do not materially impact its assigned BOPEC rating. The estimation results for the extended BOM model are presented in the last two columns of Table 6A . Overall, the parameter estimates for the supervisory variables are practically unchanged from the core model estimation results. The equity market variables do contribute to the model's overall fit; the null hypothesis that they are not significant is rejected at the 1% significance level with a likelihood ratio statistic of 105.894. 22 The results indicate that a decrease in the SCSR portion of the BHC 22. Note this likelihood ratio statistic is distributed χ 2 (8) due to the four equity market variables, the fixed effect accounting for publicly traded BHCs (i.e., θI it-in Equation (2)), and the three fixed effects accounting for publicly traded BHCs with missing equity returns, EDF values or Ronn-Verma asset volatilities. stock return has an adverse impact on ratings; i.e., a downturn in the broader equity market leads to a worsening of BOPEC ratings. Similarly, a decrease in the idiosyncratic SCAR portion has an adverse impact on BOPEC ratings. However, changes in a BHC's EDF or asset volatility do not have a significant effect on BOPEC ratings. This result may be due to the fact that these two equity market variables are encompassed by the supervisory and stock return variables already in the model. In conclusion, the full-sample estimation results clearly indicate that equity market variables contribute to the modeling of BOPEC ratings and could be useful in off-site supervisory monitoring models.
An alternative specification of the BOM model is to model the changes in BOPEC ratings, as opposed to the ratings themselves. 23 That is, instead of modeling BP* it , we could model ∆BP* it , which would translate into possible ∆BP it values of {≤ Ϫ2, Ϫ1,0,1, ≥2}. As this specification choice is effectively an empirical question, the parameter estimates for these alternative BOM models are presented in Table  6B . Since BOPEC downgrades here correspond to lower values of the dependent variable, we expect the signs on the explanatory variables to be reversed from the earlier exercise. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6A ; the significance of the parameter estimates for the three BOPEC rating models is almost identical to those for the BOPEC change models. The main difference is for the parameter on the lagged BOPEC ratings, which is positive for both specifications. This result suggests that higher (i.e., worse) lagged ratings coincide with new BOPEC ratings that are high as well, but improved. Taken together, the results suggest that there is persistence in BOPEC ratings, but also a tendency to improve over time. This result matches the rating patterns observed in Tables 3 and 4 . Since the two sets of estimation results are qualitatively similar, we focus on modeling the BOPEC ratings themselves in the remainder of the paper.
The BOM Model as an Off-site Monitoring Model
The BOM model presented above indicates that BOPEC ratings can be modeled as a function of lagged supervisory and equity market variables. However, to be a useful tool for supervisory monitoring, the model must be able to generate reasonably accurate forecasts of BOPEC ratings that supervisors could use to determine if and when additional supervisory actions are necessary. In this section, we show how to implement the BOM model as a supervisory off-site monitoring model. We find that its forecasts are reasonably accurate and capable of anticipating future BOPEC changes at up to four quarters prior to assignment.
Rolling estimation samples. To make the BOM model operational as an off-site monitoring tool, we need to permit it to adjust to current economic and banking conditions in the hope of producing more accurate forecasts. We address this concern by reestimating the model every quarter using a rolling estimation sample of four 23. We thank a referee for raising this issue. quarters. 24 Let S(t) denote the sample of BHCs assigned a BOPEC rating in the four-quarter period ending in quarter t. For our sample, S(0) encompasses the four quarters of 1989 used to generate forecasts for 1990:Q1, the first quarter in our sample; S(39) encompasses 1998:Q4 through 1999:Q3, which are used to generate forecasts for 1999:Q4. The average number of BOPEC ratings in S(t) for these 40 subsample periods is about 400. As before, each BOPEC rating assignment in a subsample has corresponding vectors of lagged explanatory variables, x iS(t) and z iS(t) , where the supervisory variables are lagged by two quarters and the equity market variables are lagged by one quarter. We estimate the BOM model parameters based on each S(t) subsample and use them to generate one-quarter-ahead BOPEC forecasts for all BHCs filing regulatory reports in quarter t. Table 7 summarizes the subsample estimation results for the core and extended BOM models by presenting the percentage of periods for which the variables 24. The choice of a four-quarter rolling estimation sample is based on current supervisory practice and data availability. The SEER model for bank CAMELS ratings uses two-quarter rolling samples. However, since there are many fewer BOPEC ratings assigned, we needed a longer rolling sample period to reasonably estimate the models. We also examined sample periods of greater than four quaters and found the parameter estimates to be qualititatively similar. are significant at the 5% level. The subsample results generally match the full sample results. For the core model, the lagged BOPEC rating, lead bank CAMELS rating, and problem loans variables all have the expected signs and are statistically significant for more than 75% of the subsamples. Other variables, such as total assets, provisions, ROAA, and equity capital, are significant in 30%-40% of the subsamples. The remaining variables are significant in less than 20% of the subsamples.
The results for supervisory variables in the extended BOM model are qualitatively similar. In contrast to the full-sample results, the parameter estimates for the four equity market variables are not consistently significant across all subsample periods. Why are the equity market variables statistically insignificant within certain subsamples and not in others? The answer is that, in a given four-quarter period, there may be simply too few publicly traded BHCs to capture the significance of the equity market variables. This explanation is supported by the fact that the publicly traded interaction terms do not come in as strong in the subsample results as they do in the full sample. Overall, in 70% of the subsamples, at least one equity market variable is significant.
BOPEC forecast analysis. The subsample estimation results indicate that both the core and extended BOM models retain most of their descriptive characteristics. Although these results are of independent interest, the purpose of conducting the subsample analysis was to generate BOPEC forecasts for potential use by supervisors. We constructed the one-step-ahead BOPEC forecasts for all BHCs in our dataset for each quarter from 1990 through 1999 using the estimated subsample parameters.
To evaluate the forecast accuracy of the two sets of forecasts, we compared the unconditional distribution of BOPEC assignments to the distributions of assignments after conditioning on the forecasts at different horizons. As shown in Table 4A , the unconditional probabilities of BOPEC upgrade, no change, or downgrade are 18.7%, 69.0%, and 12.3%, respectively. That is, given a set of BHCs and no further information, we would expect to see about 19% upgraded and 12% downgraded. After conditioning on a "large" deviation between a BOPEC forecast and the BHC's previously assigned rating, are the conditional probabilities statistically different from the unconditional probabilities? If so, the conditioning information is valuable to the forecast user. We use the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistic to test the null hypothesis that the conditional probabilities are not different from the unconditional ones and that the conditioning information is thus not informative.
Tables 8A and 8B present analysis of the distribution of BOPEC outcomes conditional on whether the BOPEC forecasts from the core and extended BOM models are more than one full rating away from the BHCs' previous ratings. We chose a signal threshold of one full rating as a simple and relatively conservative cutoff point. 25 We examine the forecast accuracy of these one-step-ahead forecasts at up to four quarters prior to the actual BOPEC assignments. For example, in the first three rows of Table 8A , we divide the core model's BOPEC forecasts at four quarters prior to assignment into three categories based on the magnitude of their forecast signal. There are 33 forecasts that signal a BOPEC upgrade, and of those, 17 (or 51.5%) BHCs were upgraded four quarters later. This percentage is much greater than the expected six (or 18.7%) upgrades without conditioning on this signal.
Assignments leading to no change in ratings are the largest category and are forecasted well at all four horizons. That is, the percentages of BOPEC no changes observed when the core and extended BOM forecasts are "close" to the current rating (i.e., the absolute value of the difference between the forecast and the lagged rating is less than or equal to one) are all about 70%.
More noteworthy is that both sets of BOM forecasts accurately signal BOPEC changes at all four horizons. The percentage of BOPEC change signals that are correct are well above the unconditional percentages observed over the full sample. Downgrades are correctly signaled about 60% of the time at four quarters prior to the actual downgrade, and the percentages steadily improve to about 80% at one quarter prior to the downgrade. Upgrades are correctly signaled about 50% of the time by the core model and 60% by the extended model at four-quarter prior. These percentages improve markedly to about 90% at one-quarter prior.
Overall, both sets of BOM forecasts provide the correct signal about 70% of the time at all four horizons. As shown by the Pearson statistics reported in the tables, 25 . Obviously, different thresholds are possible and imply differing combinations of Type-I and Type-II classification errors. both sets of forecasts reject the null hypothesis that the conditional probabilities of BOPEC outcomes are equal to the unconditional probabilities. These results clearly indicate that both sets of BOM forecasts are capable of detecting BOPEC assignments up to four-quarter prior and would thus be useful for supervisory monitoring purposes.
A further interesting question is whether the extended BOM model incorporating equity market variables forecasts more accurately than the core model. The last column of Table 8B presents the Pearson statistics testing the null hypothesis that conditioning on signals derived from the extended BOM forecasts is equivalent to conditioning on signals from the core BOM forecasts. The Pearson statistics do not reject the null hypothesis at any horizon. While the conditional probabilities generated by the extended BOM are generally a little bit higher than those generated by the core BOM, the differences are not large enough to be statistically significant. Hence, from the strict standpoint of forecast accuracy, these results suggest that supervisors may not need to incorporate equity market information into the BOM model to generate useful forecasts. However, given the low cost of doing so and the potential value of such information, we recommend that the extended BOM model be used for supervisory monitoring purposes. Note: This table presents the forecast accuracy results based on conditioning on the adjusted BOPEC forecasts from the extended BOM model at different horizons. The forecast signal is whether the difference between the forecast and the previously assigned BOPEC rating has an absolute value greater than one. The cells in bold indicate the outcome expected based on the signal observed. Note that the number of observations changes with the horizon due to data restrictions. The % columns represent the percentage of forecasts (i.e., number of observations in a row that were correct). The "total % correct" column reports the accuracy of all the forecasts. The Pearson goodnessof-fit statistic denoted as P. stat. 1 tests the null hypothesis that the distribution of BOPEC outcomes conditional on the adjusted BOPEC forecasts from the extended BOM model is not different from the unconditional distribution and that the forecasts are not informative. The Pearson goodness-of-fit statistic denoted as P. stat. 2 tests the null hypothesis that the distribution of BOPEC outcomes conditional on the adjusted BOPEC forecasts from the extended BOM model is not different from the distribution conditional on the adjusted forecasts from the core model and that the forecasts from the extended model are not relatively informative. The statistics are distributed χ 2 8 . An asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level.
CONCLUSION
The public policy question of how bank supervisors could use securities market information to complement their monitoring of BHCs has received renewed attention in the U.S. and internationally over the past few years. In this paper, we propose the BOM model that directly incorporates equity market information into supervisory off-site monitoring models. Our empirical results suggest that equity market variables are useful in-sample for explaining BOPEC ratings. Out-of-sample, our forecasting results indicate that the BOM forecasts based purely on supervisory data anticipate BOPEC assignments fairly well at up to four-quarter prior to assignment. However, including equity market variables in the model does not improve forecast accuracy in a statistically significant way.
We argue that using the extended BOM model including equity market variables should still have practical value for supervisors. Our argument is based on three points. First, equity market data are available on a more timely basis than standard supervisory data. The higher frequency equity information could potentially signal important BHC changes sooner than standard supervisory reporting or confirm supervisory concerns that might arise over the short term. Second, since the cost of incorporating equity market variables into supervisory off-site monitoring within the BOM model is low, even small net improvements in forecast accuracy could still be of value. As noted by Stern (2001) , the benefits of incorporating financial market data into the supervisory process "seem real enough and costs of increased use low enough" to warrant doing so. Finally, market assessments should provide an alternative opinion on BHC condition that may serve as a reasonable cross check of supervisory evaluations, both for supervisors and for the public at large.
Note that our empirical results and conclusions are necessarily based on historical data. We have no guarantee that equity market signals, which were shown to be of some use given the current supervisory regime, would continue to be useful under a regime that explicitly incorporated market signals into supervisory policy. If a change in policy served to lessen the sense that equity market investors feel at risk, then the policy change could destroy their incentive to monitor and produce this information. However, as long as supervisors use equity market information solely for monitoring purposes and not for formal policy actions, the incentives to equity market investors should not be affected.
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